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Abstract 
Policy proposals often contain complex legal, technical, or scientific jargon making it 
difficult for people to evaluate their favorability towards the policy. We proposed one 
experiment testing the effect of language complexity on people’s evaluation of a policy 
proposal as moderated by their initial policy beliefs. We hypothesized that when a policy 
was consistent with one’s beliefs or if participants had no policy preference, they would 
evaluate it more favorably when it was simple than when it was complex; when a policy 
was inconsistent with one’s beliefs, they would evaluate it less unfavorably when it was 
complex than when it was simple. Results confirmed our hypotheses. This demonstrates 
that complex information does not always make people judge policies more negatively 
but rather causes people to weigh complex information less heavily in their judgments. 
Keywords: processing fluency, language complexity, policy attitudes, attitudes 
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Language Complexity, Belief-consistency, and the Evaluation of Policies 
In current American politics, it is extremely difficult for the average citizen to 
evaluate policy proposals because they often contain complex legal, technical, or 
scientific jargon. Although any policy proposal may contain complex language, some 
issues are especially prone to complex language use because they consist of complicated 
economic, technological, or scientific concepts. Such issues include taxes and 
environmental conservation policies. Complex policy language is problematic for 
American voters because it can interfere with their ability to discern whether a message is 
consistent or inconsistent with their beliefs. The current experiment will test the 
proposition that as issue language complexity increases, people will mistakably deviate 
from their own policy preferences by rating preference-consistent policies less favorably 
and preference-inconsistent policies less unfavorably than they otherwise would. The 
findings from this experiment will help explain why Americans may vote against their 
own policy preferences, pointing to the importance of policy communication and civic 
education. 
Issue Language Complexity 
 In order for citizens to vote according to their policy preferences, they have to 
understand the corresponding policy proposals. Yet, research shows that most voters 
agree that ballot initiatives are too complex to understand (Cronin, 1989). Therefore it is 
not surprising that citizens are less likely to participate when they must vote for 
legislation (which may be difficult to understand) rather than for a representative (Cronin, 
1989; Everson, 1981). Magleby (1984) argues that the lack of voting on ballot initiatives 
can be explained by the use of overly complex language. Thus, even for people who 
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participate, complex language makes it difficult for them to accurately gauge the extent to 
which the policy lines up with their existing beliefs about whether or not the policy 
should be implemented.  
 The research examining language complexity, also known as processing fluency, 
has a very clear conclusion: information that people can easily process (e.g. simple 
language) is judged more favorably than information that is difficult to process (e.g., 
complex language; for a review, see Reber et al., 2004). Although processing fluency has 
been manipulated both perceptually (e.g. small font; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012) and 
conceptually (e.g. complex language; Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015; Shepherd & Kay, 
2012), we focus on fluency as defined by the ease with which language is processed. This 
is because of the clear relevance complex language has to the evaluation of policy 
proposals.  
 In a series of experiments, Oppenheimer (2006) manipulated the language 
complexity of three different kinds of text (personal statements, dissertation abstracts, 
and philosophical essays) and had participants rate the intelligence of the author. In all 
experiments, increasing complexity produced lower intelligence ratings (Oppenheimer; 
2006; Experiments 1-3). The effect remained robust regardless of the actual quality of the 
essay, or prior beliefs about the quality of the essay. Oppenheimer demonstrates that such 
effects are at least partly driven by how easily people can process the information (i.e. 
fluency). That is, complex language made the information difficult to process and 
therefore affected people’s judgment of the supposed authors.  
 The effect of fluency on stock market prices provides a compelling real-world 
example. Alter and Oppenheimer (2006) found that companies with fluent names 
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performed better in two U.S. stock markets than companies with relatively less fluent 
names.  
Recent experimental evidence showed, compared to a simply worded policy, a 
complexly worded policy reduced people’s likelihood of voting for that policy and led to 
less favorable attitudes toward the policy (Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015). This finding 
appears to be robust to whether participants agree or disagree with the underlying 
message of the policy. In addition to reducing people’s likelihood of voting for a policy, 
another series of studies found that complex language motivates people to avoid learning 
more about the issue—an effect termed “the perpetuation of ignorance” (Shepherd & 
Kay, 2012). 
Based on such evidence, it would appear that complex language always leads 
people to judge information less favorably. However, a more precise analysis suggests 
language complexity determines the extent to which people rely on the content of the 
message to inform their attitudes. That is, when the content of a message is simple and 
easy to comprehend, people judge the message based on its merit (i.e., they take the 
central route to persuasion) rather than on peripheral cues, such as the status of the source 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Hafer, Reynolds, & Obertynski, 1996). When the content of a 
message is complex, on the other hand, people rely more on peripheral cues to form their 
judgments. For example, Hafer, Reynolds, and Obertynski (1996), found that participants 
rated a simply worded message more favorably when it was strong than when it was 
weak, meaning that they judged the message based on its merit. When the message 
contained complex language, participants rated it more favorably when it came from a 
high-status source than a low-status source, but the strength of the message had no effect 
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on participants’ judgment of it. This supports the idea that, when the message language is 
simple, people rely more on message content (e.g. whether one agrees or disagrees with 
it) to inform their judgments but rely less on message content when the message language 
is complex. 
Accumulating evidence suggests that, rather than being positive itself, easily 
processed information carries more weight in people’s judgments than information that is 
difficult to process. For example, Shah and Oppenheimer (2007) presented participants 
with conflicting (both positive and negative) information about an object and 
manipulated whether the positive information was easy to process (low complexity) and 
negative information difficult to process (high complexity), or vice versa. Participants 
judged the object more positively when the positive information was relatively easier to 
process but judged it more negatively when the negative information was relatively easier 
to process. In other words, information that was easy to process had a greater impact on 
people’s judgments.  
The current experiment builds on previous research (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007; 
Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015) by considering how people’s pre-existing policy preferences 
alter the effects of language complexity on policy favorability ratings. As opposed to 
using positive and negative information (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007), the current 
experiment will demonstrate that people’s pre-existing policy preferences will determine 
how language complexity affects their judgment of a policy proposal. Our proposed 
mechanism is the same as previous research in this domain (Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015). 
That is, complex language makes information difficult to process and therefore affects 
judgment of the attitude object. However, rather than arguing that difficult processing 
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always leads to more negative judgments, we instead argue that it makes people weigh 
the information less heavily (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007). For example, relative to 
simple language, complex language makes it difficult for people to process their 
agreement with a preference-consistent message or their disagreement with a preference-
inconsistent message. That is, people’s judgments should be more extreme when the 
policy is in simple language because it is easier for people to process their agreement or 
disagreement with the policy. On the contrary, complex language makes processing 
difficult and should therefore lead to less extreme ratings (i.e. preference-consistent 
policies less positive and preference-inconsistent policies less negative). This would 
suggest that the influence of language complexity depends on whether or not one agrees 
with the policy.  
We will extend the existing findings by manipulating whether or not a policy is 
consistent with participants’ pre-existing policy preferences (consistent vs. inconsistent 
vs. no preference) in addition to manipulating issue language complexity (simple vs. 
complex) to test the hypothesis that people will judge a preference-consistent policy more 
favorably when it is simple than when it is complex and will judge a preference-
inconsistent policy less unfavorably when it is complex than when it is simple. This is 
because a simple preference-inconsistent policy can more easily be processed as 
inconsistent with one’s current beliefs than a complex one. Likewise, preference-
consistent information should be more easily processed and thus more likely to produce a 
positive judgment when it is simple rather than when it is complex. When people have no 
policy preference, we expect them to judge the policy more favorably when it is simple 
than when it is complex (Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015). Because we expect the effect of 
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complexity to reverse depending on whether the policy is consistent or inconsistent with 
the participant’s initial policy preference, we do not expect a main effect of complexity. 
We do, however, expect a main effect of policy preference such that preference-
consistent policies will be rated more favorably than preference-inconsistent policies (e.g. 
Edwards & Smith, 1996; See Figure 1). 
Method 
Participants and Power Analysis 
Our preregistration can be found at https://osf.io/mrkv3/.1 Three hundred and 
twenty seven participants (Mage = 35.82, SDage = 11.50; Male = 179, Female = 146, Did 
not respond = 2) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk). The study 
was restricted to participants in the United States who had completed a minimum of 100 
tasks, and had a task approval rate of at least 85%.   
 We used the G*Power software to calculate our sample size (for details on the 
G*Power software, see Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; See Appendix A for all 
information we entered into G*Power). The methods used in the current experiment 
closely mirror those of Shockley and Fairdosi (2015), which enabled an informed effect 
size estimate to calculate a sufficient sample size. They found effects of complexity on 
policy attitude with sizes ranging from Cohen’s d = .29 to d = .44. Although we did not 
expect the 2 (Language complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 3 (Preference-consistency: 																																																								1	The	Open	Science	Framework	(OSF)	preregistration	at	https://osf.io/mrkv3/	contains	our	primary	hypothesis	of	interest	and	the	procedure	used	for	the	study.	However,	after	receiving	helpful	reviewer	feedback,	we	made	several	additions	to	the	analysis	plan	and	to	the	procedure	without	deviating	from	the	analyses	and	procedure	that	were	planned	in	the	preregistration.	Additionally,	we	modified	our	goal	sample	size	to	accommodate	the	additional	analyses.	Because	all	hypotheses,	analyses,	and	procedures	were	approved	before	data	collection	(as	per	the	rules	of	registered	reports)	we	mark	such	analyses	as	preregistered	even	though	they	contain	additional	information	than	what	was	included	in	the	OSF	preregistration.	A	detailed	explanation	of	the	reasons	for	making	adjustments	after	completing	the	preregistration,	as	well	as	the	analysis	plan	that	was	approved	in	stage	1	of	this	manuscript	before	data	collection,	can	be	found	at	https://osf.io/dt2u2/.	
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Consistent, Inconsistent, or No preference) interaction to be moderated by issue, we 
calculated our goal sample size to retain at least 80% power to test the 2 (Language 
complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 3 (Preference-consistency: Consistent, Inconsistent, 
or No preference) X 2 (Issue: Climate Change vs. Taxing Corporations) interaction with 
an effect size of d = .365 (i.e. the average effect size in the range above). This power 
analysis calls for 293 participants. Using a sample size that has adequate power to detect 
the above three-way interaction ensured that we had more than adequate power to detect 
the 2 (Language complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 3 (Preference-consistency: 
Consistent, Inconsistent, or No preference) interaction, which was our primary analysis of 
interest.  
Because we expected to exclude participants for failing to pass the attention check 
(Hauser & Shwarz, 2016), we recruited 327 participants in order to retain adequate 
statistical power after excluding such participants. Participants passed the attention check 
at a higher rate than expected: 6 participants (1.8%) were excluded for failing it (4 in the 
simple condition, 2 in the complex condition). One additional participant was excluded 
for failing to report their position on corporate taxes. To further ensure an appropriate 
sample size, we set our minimum cell sample size to 15 participants for our primary 
groups of interest (i.e. not including the no-preference category). We surpassed the 
minimum cell sample size; the smallest cell sample size was 25.  
Procedure 
All materials and procedures were exactly as preregistered. First, participants read 
an information page and complete a modified version of Zhou and Fishbach’s (2016) 
remedy to participant attrition in which participants typed a sentence stating they will 
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complete the full survey. Next, participants indicated their position on two political issues 
(Climate Change or Taxing Corporations) and answered demographic questions. 
Participants were then be randomly assigned to conditions. The current experiment used a 
2 (Language complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 3 (Preference-consistency: Consistent, 
Inconsistent, No Preference) X 2 (Issue: Climate Change, Taxing Corporations) between 
subjects design. Because the primary analysis tests the interaction between complexity 
and preference-consistency, we collapsed across the two issues (however, exploratory 
analyses examined the effect of issue, as described below). The survey software was 
programmed to randomly assign participants to one policy that may be consistent, 
inconsistent, or neither (i.e. when participants have no policy preference) with their 
position on that issue. The policy was presented in either complex or simple language. 
Participants then rated their attitude toward the policy.  
Materials 
 Attrition remedy.  First, participants read a general description of the study: 
“Thank you for choosing to participate in this HIT! In this study we will ask about your 
opinions on two political issues. We want to know what you think regardless of your 
level of interest or participation in politics. There are no right or wrong answers. We just 
want to know your honest opinions. Thank you!” Then participants completed a modified 
version of Zhou and Fishbach’s (2016) attrition remedy on the next page, “Many mTurk 
workers tend to quit once they see the tasks. If a sizable number of people quit the 
survey halfway, the data quality of that survey would be compromised. However, 
our research depends on good quality data. Thus, before taking this survey, please 
make sure you do not mind completing the tasks described above.” Then participants 
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were instructed, “Please type below ‘I will complete the full survey’ so that we can 
ensure your data will be of high quality. Thank you!” and then there was a text box for 
them to type the requested sentence and another that asked for their mTurk identification 
number. 
Policy preferences. Participants then rated their initial policy preferences by 
selecting either For, Against, or I Don’t Know for both policies: “Are you for or against 
legislation that would require corporations to pay higher taxes?”; “Are you for or against 
legislation that would require businesses to report their usage of fuel and energy?” 
Participants also rated the personal importance of each issue (1 = Not at all important, 7 
= Extremely important). 
 Attention check. To ensure participants were not mindlessly responding, we 
included a modified attention check question from Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko 
(2009). Participants were shown a block of text that appeared to be a question about the 
kinds of political activities in which the participants engages. After three sentences, the 
message instructed the participant to ignore the instructions and click on an option they 
would otherwise never choose and ignore all other options (“Run for president of the 
USA”; see Appendix B). Hauser and Shwarz (2016; Study 1) found that 95% of mTurk 
workers passed a similar attention check whereas only 39% of subject pool participants 
did. This supported our decision to recruit our participants from mTurk.  
 Preference-consistency manipulation. Belief-consistency was manipulated by 
randomly assigning participants to a policy that was either “for” or “against” one of the 
initial issues participants rated in the beginning of the experiment. We used participants’ 
initial policy position (i.e. For, Against, or I Don’t Know) to categorize them as having 
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received a preference-consistent policy (for a policy they are for, or against a policy they 
are against), a preference-inconsistent policy (against a policy they are for, or for a policy 
they are against), or neither (when they marked I Don’t Know as their initial position; see 
section below on Pre-processing steps).  
Language complexity manipulation. Issue complexity was manipulated by 
presenting the policy in either simple or complex language. Simply worded policies were 
revised using a thesaurus and online dictionaries to replace simple words with complex 
words. For example, the simply worded policy against environmental restrictions on 
business (i.e. against addressing climate change) was “This initiative is to loosen 
restrictions on businesses that suffer due to the spread of climate change information. 
They will not have to report their usage of any form of fuel and energy.” The complex 
version of this policy was “This initiative is to slacken circumscriptions on vendors that 
have been writhing due to propagation of ecological data. They will not have to report 
their expenditure of materials that lead to radiative forcing such as Chlorofluorocarbons.” 
 To ensure that the complex policies were more complex than the simple policies, 
we submitted the policies to the Flesch–Kincaid readability test (Flesch, 1948) that 
computes the ease-of-readability of a passage based on the total number of words, 
sentences, and syllables in the passage. Complex policies had a much lower score (M = 
21.7) than simple policies (M = 56.1), indicating they were more difficult to understand. 
All versions of the policy proposals used in this experiment— along with their 
corresponding Flesch-Kincaid readability test scores—are available in Appendix C. 
 We sought to corroborate our readability analysis of complexity by pretesting the 
processing ease of all policies in the experiment. We recruited 65 participants from 
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Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and randomly assigned them to rate either the four complex 
(For and Against for each issue) or four simple versions of the policies2. Participants read 
“While ignoring your own opinion on the message content, please rate your agreement 
with each statement regarding each brief message. The questions aim to measure how 
complex the wording is for each message” and then rated the four policies on processing 
ease (see question in the section below). We conducted independent samples t-tests to 
determine if there were significant differences in processing ease between policies with 
simple versus complex language. In all cases, participants in the simple condition rated 
each policy as significantly easier to process than participants in the complex condition 
(all ps < .001; see Table 1). Further, we used a mixed ANOVA to test the 2 (Language 
complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 4 (Issue: Climate Change Against, Climate Change 
For, Taxing Corporations Against, Taxing Corporations For) interaction to ensure that 
differences in processing ease for simple versus complex policies do not differ as a 
function of which policy the participant was rating. The interaction was not significant, 
F(3, 180) = .32, p = .812. Further, we collapsed policies across issue position (i.e. For vs. 
Against) and conducted paired samples t-tests to determine if there were differences in 
processing ease within complex and simple conditions. The difference in processing ease 
was not significant within either the complex condition, t(30) = 1.67, p = .105, or within 
the simple condition, t(30) = 1.57, p = .1273. 
																																																								2	Three	participants	were	removed	from	the	pretest	because	of	missing	data.	3	It	is	worth	noting	that	both	t-tests	are	not	very	far	from	conventional	levels	of	statistical	significance	and	are	both	in	the	same	direction,	showing	that	policies	on	taxing	corporations	were	somewhat	easier	to	process	than	policies	on	climate	change.	Because	the	differences	are	not	substantial,	we	argue	that	it	is	sufficient	to	test	if	issue	moderates	the	expected	2	(Language	complexity:	Simple	vs.	Complex)	X	3	(Preference-consistency:	Consistent	vs.	Inconsistent	vs.	No	preference)	interaction.	
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 Processing ease. The mechanism of processing ease was measured with one item: 
“I can easily understand how this policy works” (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly 
agree; Shepherd & Kay, 2012; Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015). 
Policy attitude. People’s attitude towards the policy was assessed with three 
items adapted from Shockley and Fairdosi (2015): “Do you like or dislike the effect of 
this policy on businesses?”; “Do you like or dislike the idea of this policy being put into 
effect?” (1 = strongly dislike, 7 = strongly like); “Would you vote in favor or against this 
policy?” (1 = definitely vote against, 7 = definition vote in favor). The items were the 
same for both issues. All items were averaged to form an attitude favorability composite 
(α = .97). Attitude favorability was the primary dependent measure.  
Results 
Pre-processing steps  
Because our main analysis depends on participants’ initial views on political 
issues, we first created our preference-consistency variable. For example, if a participant 
was in favor of taxing corporations and received a policy that argued in favor of that 
position, that variable was coded as preference-consistent. If they were in favor of taxing 
corporations but receive a policy that argues against that position, that variable was coded 
as preference-inconsistent. People who marked “I Don’t Know” on their assigned issue 
were coded as no-preference. The same was applied to both issues. 
Preregistered analyses 
 Initial analyses. We conducted an independent samples t-test to test if simply 
worded policies were rated as easier to process than complexly worded policies (i.e. 
manipulation check). Indeed, participants rated policies using simple language as 
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significantly easier to process (M = 4.98, SD = 1.81) than policies using complex 
language (M = 3.26, SD = 1.80), t(319) = 8.50, p < .001, d = .95, 95% CI [1.38, 2.05] 
(one-tailed). 
We conducted a between-participants ANOVA to test the 2 (Language 
complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 3 (Preference-consistency: Consistent, Inconsistent, 
or No preference) X 2 (Issue: Climate Change vs. Taxing Corporations) interaction to 
determine if issue moderated our primary analysis of interest (the Language Complexity 
X Preference Consistency interaction). As expected, the three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(2, 308) = .60, p = .552, η2partial = .004 (two-tailed). Because we expected the 
effects of complexity to reverse depending on whether the policy was consistent or 
inconsistent with participants’ initial policy preference, we did not expect a main effect of 
complexity. However, the main effect of complexity was significant, F(1, 308) = 5.12, p 
= .024, η2partial = .016 (two-tailed). In line with previous research (Shockley & Fairdosi, 
2015), participants rated policies using simple language more favorably (M = 4.08, SD = 
2.20) than policies using complex language (M = 3.84, SD = 1.61). As expected, there 
was a significant main effect of belief consistency, F(2, 308) = 76.23, p < .001, η2partial = 
.331 (one-tailed). Independent samples t-tests demonstrated that participants rated the 
policy consistent with their preference significantly more favorably (M = 4.97, SD = 
1.65) than when it was inconsistent with their policy preference (M = 2.84, SD = 1.65), 
t(278) = 10.83, p < .001, d = 1.30, 95% CI [1.81, 2.46] (one-tailed), or when the 
participant indicated no position on the issue (i.e. answered “I Don’t Know”) (M = 4.05, 
SD = 1.50), t(180) = 3.34, p <.001, d = .62, 95% CI [.49, 1.45] (one-tailed). Additionally, 
participants rated a policy on which they had no preference significantly more favorably 
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than a policy that was inconsistent with their preference, t(176) = 4.04, p <.001, d = .75, 
95% CI [.69, 1.64] (one-tailed). Unexpectedly, there was a main effect of issue such that 
participants ratings on corporate taxes were significantly more favorable (M = 4.09, SD = 
1.78) than ratings on climate change (M = 3.79, SD = 2.02), F(1, 308) = 5.09, p = .025, 
η2partial = .016 (two-tailed). Also unexpected, the complexity X issue interaction was also 
significant such that the simple effect of complexity on attitudes toward corporate taxes 
was significant, but the simple effect of complexity on attitudes toward climate change 
was negligible, F(1, 308) = 7.51, p = .006, η2partial = .024 (two-tailed). 
Tests of main hypotheses. As per our preregistered hypothesis, we expected that 
when participants receive an issue that is consistent with their policy preference, they 
would rate it more favorably when it was simply worded than when wording was 
complex. We expected the same effect for when participants rate an issue on which they 
have no policy preference. However, we hypothesized that when participants rate a policy 
that is inconsistent with their policy preference, they will rate it less unfavorably when it 
is complex than when it is simple (see Figure 1 for our preregistered proposed results). 
Because the 2 (Language Complexity) X 3 (Belief Consistency) X 2 (Issue) three-way 
interaction was not significant, we collapsed across issue and conducted a between-
subjects ANOVA to test the 2 (Language Complexity) X 3 (Belief-Consistency) 
interaction—our main analysis of interest. As expected, it was significant, F(2, 314) = 
15.51, p < .001, η2partial = .090 (one-tailed; see Figure 2). To parse the interaction we 
conducted three independent samples t-tests examining whether language complexity 
caused significant differences in policy favorability separately for each level of belief-
consistency. As expected, when the policy was consistent with participants’ policy 
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preference, policies using simple language were rated significantly more favorably (M = 
5.78, SD = 1.35) than those using complex language (M = 4.42, SD = 1.62), t(138) = 
5.24, p < .001, d = .92, 95% CI [.93, 1.80] (one-tailed). Likewise, when participants 
indicated that they had no policy preference, policies using simple language were rated 
significantly more favorably (M = 4.44, SD = 1.76) than those using complex language 
(M = 3.68, SD = 1.12), t(43) = 1.73, d = .51, p = .046, 95% CI [.02, 1.50] (one-tailed). 
Also consistent with our hypothesis, when participants rated a policy that was 
inconsistent with their initial policy preferences, they rated the policy less unfavorably 
when it contained complex language (M = 3.19, SD = 1.51) than when it contained 
simple language (M = 2.48, SD = 1.72), t(133) = -2.57, p = .006, d = -.44, 95% CI [-1.17, 
-.25] (one-tailed). 
Mediation analyses. Next, as outlined in our preregistered analysis plan, we 
sought to test if processing ease mediated the effect of language complexity on policy 
favorability. We used the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Model 4; Hayes, 2013) to run a 
simple mediation model separately for each level of belief-consistency (i.e. consistent, 
inconsistent, or no preference). In each model, we entered language complexity as the 
predictor (X; simple = 0, complex = 1), processing ease as the mediator (M; continuous), 
and policy favorability as the dependent variable (Y; continuous) (see Figure 3). As 
expected, when the policy was consistent with participants’ preference, complexity led to 
lower policy favorability indirectly through processing ease as evidenced by the bootstrap 
confidence interval that excludes zero (see Table 2 for all mediation results). The results 
were the same for participants that received a policy on which they had no preference. 
When the policy was consistent with participants’ preference, complexity led to higher 
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policy favorability indirectly through processing ease, but the bootstrap confidence 
interval overlapped with zero and is therefore not significant. 
Exploratory analyses. We were interested in testing whether our main analysis 
of interest (the complexity X belief-consistency interaction) would be moderated by issue 
importance. We marked this analysis as exploratory because we were able to come up 
with rationale for expecting that the interaction would be either stronger or weaker for 
issues that were rated as more important. For example, it is plausible that the effect size 
for issues rated as most important will be larger because when it is described in simple 
language, participants should be more inclined to give it an extreme rating, thus leading 
to a larger difference between complexly versus simply worded policies. However, it is 
also plausible that the effect size will be smaller for issues rated as most important. 
Important issues should be seen as personally relevant, which has been repeatedly found 
to increase elaboration of the message content (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986). Thus, such close attention to highly important policies may reduce 
the effect of complexity on policy attitude. Because issue importance could produce 
plausible effects in opposite directions, it was difficult to make predictions and this 
analysis was therefore considered exploratory. 
In order to explore the potential moderating effects of issue importance, we 
entered Language Complexity, Issue Importance, and two dummy variables for Belief 
Consistency (reference category = No preference) into a multiple regression model. Issue 
importance did not moderate Complexity X Belief-Consistency interaction as indicated 
by the non-significant three-way interaction, (b = -.16, SE = .21), t(309) = -.77, p = .444, 
95% CI [-.57, .25] (two-tailed). The Belief-Consistency X Issue Importance interaction 
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was significant, (b = .40, SE = .11), t(309) = 3.63, p < .001, 95% CI [.18, .61] (two-
tailed). Unsurprisingly, the effect of belief-consistency (i.e. belief-consistent policies 
rated more favorably than belief-inconsistent policies) got stronger as issue importance 
increased, as denoted by the significant positive interaction term. 
Discussion 
 Our results confirm our primary hypothesis that belief-consistency moderates the 
effect of language complexity on policy favorability. That is, when participants received 
a policy that was consistent with their beliefs, they rated it more favorably when it 
contained simple language than when it contained complex language. The effect was the 
same when participants had no policy preference, consistent with the prior literature on 
the effect of language complexity that had not considered the role of pre-existing 
opinions. On the other hand, when participants received a policy that was inconsistent 
with their beliefs, they rated it less unfavorably when it contained complex language than 
when it contained simple language. We also confirmed that processing ease mediated the 
effect of language complexity on policy favorability when participants were rating either 
a belief consistent policy or one in which they had no preference. However, processing 
ease did not mediate the effect of language complexity on policy favorability when 
participants received a belief-inconsistent policy. Additionally, neither issue (corporate 
taxes or climate change), nor issue importance moderated our effects. 
 These findings contextualize recent research that demonstrates that complex 
language causes lower policy favorability (Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015). That is, we 
demonstrate that complexity lowers policy favorability only when the policy is consistent 
with the participant’s initial policy preferences or if the participant has no initial policy 
LANGUAGE	COMPLEXITY,	BELIEF-CONSISTENCY,	AND	POLICY	EVALUATION	 	 	20
preference. On the contrary, we demonstrate that the opposite occurs when the policy is 
inconsistent with participants’ beliefs. In this case, participants rated a policy with 
complex language more favorably (or less unfavorably) than one using simple language. 
These results can be explained by Shah and Oppenheimer’s (2007) framework on cue 
weighting. That is, information that is difficult to process (i.e. complex language) is 
weighed less heavily in attitude judgment than information that is easy to process (i.e. 
simple language). For example, complex policy language made it difficult for participants 
to process their favor (or disfavor) towards the policy, making their attitudes less 
favorable when they agreed with the policy and less unfavorable when they disagreed 
with the policy. In short, their attitudes became less extreme. These results extend 
previous research (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007) by incorporating people’s pre-existing 
attitudes towards the attitude object as opposed to novel positivity or negativity of the 
information. Additionally, this extends the phenomenon of cue weighting to judgments of 
policy favorability. 
 It is worth noting the variability in effect sizes. According to our framework, it is 
plausible to expect that the difference in favorability between simple and complex 
policies would be larger when participants have a pre-existing position on the policy 
(preference-consistent or inconsistent) as opposed to when participants have no 
preference. However, this was apparent only for belief-consistent policies, in which the 
effect size was large. The effect size was actually smaller for belief-inconsistent policies 
than for those in which participants had no preference. It is unclear why the effect size 
was more than twice as large for belief-consistent policies than for belief-inconsistent 
policies. One possibility is that the differences in effect size were partly due to where 
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favorability ratings were when the policy contained simple language. For preference 
consistent policies, the mean for the simply worded version was near the maximum value 
of the scale (i.e. 5.78; maximum = 7). For preference-inconsistent policies, the mean for 
the simply worded version was not as extreme relative to the minimum value of the scale 
(i.e. 2.48; minimum = 1). Because our results showed that people’s favorability ratings 
became less extreme when the policy was shown in complex language, participants rating 
belief-inconsistent policies had a shorter distance to travel before they reached the 
midpoint (i.e. the place they presumably would not cross as a result of complexity alone).  
Although this may account for some difference in effect size, it is unlikely that it 
accounts for a substantial portion of the large difference in effect size we observed. A 
more plausible reason why the effect size was substantially smaller for belief-inconsistent 
policies is because belief-inconsistent information is subject to more scrutiny than belief-
consistent information (see Edwards & Smith, 1996). Thus, this could reduce the effect of 
complexity because people are dedicating more cognitive resources to scrutinizing the 
belief-inconsistent policies, thereby making language complexity less influential in one’s 
judgment. This might also explain why processing ease did not mediate the effect of 
complexity on policy favorability for belief-inconsistent policies but did for belief-
consistent policies and those on which participants had no preference. 
Limitations and future directions 
 A potential criticism of this work is that the wording of the complex policies were 
inscrutable and therefore participants moved towards the center of the attitude scale 
because of their total lack of understanding. However, this is unlikely because there was a 
large main effect of belief-consistency, demonstrating that participants were in fact able 
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to identify the policy as in line with their preferences when the policy was complex, they 
just did so less strongly. 
 Additionally, it is not totally clear how this research reconciles with Menegatti 
and Rubini’s (2013) findings that abstract messages are more persuasive than concrete 
messages when the audience holds a similar position but concrete messages are more 
persuasive than abstract messages when the audience holds a different position from the 
speaker. Our experiment aimed to keep everything about each policy the same (including 
level of abstraction) except for our two independent variables: language complexity and 
issue-preference. Menegatti and Rubini (2013), suggest that abstract language is more 
persuasive to an audience with a similar position to the speaker because having common 
ground with the audience allows the speaker to rely more on figurative language. When 
the audience holds a different position from the speaker or is heterogeneous, the speaker 
has to bridge a gap in common knowledge and is therefore more persuasive when they 
use concrete language. In our current experiment, all language was relatively concrete. 
However, it would be interesting for future research to examine if the effect of language 
complexity is different depending on the level of language abstraction.  
Another limitation of this work is that we did not manipulate conceptual fluency. 
That is, we manipulated language complexity while keeping the policy concepts 
conceptually the same. For example, a conceptually complex policy would have many 
working parts whereas a conceptually simple policy would have few. It is plausible to 
expect that conceptual fluency works similarly to language complexity in that it makes 
people weigh complex concepts less heavily in their judgments. A potentially fruitful 
way to explore this would be to manipulate the conceptual fluency of several issues and 
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gauge the importance of each issue participants assign to conceptually simple (i.e. fluent) 
versus complex (i.e. disfluent) issues. Consider, for example, the issue of healthcare in 
the United States. The same issue could be framed as relying on few factors (e.g. whether 
our government decides to allocate the funds to it) or a collection of factors (e.g. whether 
states decide to opt in, cutting funds from other programs, and projections of cost). 
Additionally, it would be possible to use the same manipulation between issues. For 
example, when people decide how much weight they place on a particular issue when 
evaluating political candidates, they might place greater weight on issues that (at least 
seemingly) rely on fewer factors (i.e. conceptually simple) than those that rely on several 
factors (i.e. conceptually complex). 
 Another interesting future direction for this research would be to investigate the 
role of complexity (and thus processing fluency) in defense of one’s policy positions. For 
example, in her investigation of the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, Ahluwalia (2000) found 
that when the information against then-president Bill Clinton was too difficult to refute, 
Clinton supporters defensively reduced the weight they placed on negatively affected 
traits (e.g. honesty) and raised the weight they placed on other traits such as Clinton’s 
intelligence. It is plausible to expect that people defensively shift their reasons for 
supporting a political candidate (i.e. the weight they place on a given trait or issue) 
towards traits that easily come to mind (high accessibility) or traits that are otherwise 
easy to process (high conceptual fluency). Because our findings demonstrate that people 
weigh information more heavily when it is easy to process, people who are motivated to 
maintain a positive view of their favored political candidate can defend their support for 
the candidate by shifting the weight they assign to criticized issues and move the weight 
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towards issues that are easy to process (e.g. has high accessibility, relies on few factors, 
or if person has ample information on the issue). 
 In conclusion, communication of policy information is a critical factor in 
determining people’s attitudes towards a policy. It is worrisome that wording differences 
can have substantial effects on policy attitudes because “muddying the waters” (i.e. 
making an issue more confusing) can become the tactic of unscrupulous political 
partisans as a way of reducing support for a policy they are against. On the other hand, 
simplicity of policy information can help garner support for important policies. The 
current work sheds light on the importance of not only the content of a policy, but how it 
is communicated.   
  
LANGUAGE	COMPLEXITY,	BELIEF-CONSISTENCY,	AND	POLICY	EVALUATION	 	 	25
References 
Ahluwalia, R. (2000). Examination of psychological processes underlying resistance to 
persuasion. Journal of Consumer Research, 27(2), 217-232. 
Alter, A. L., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2006). Predicting short-term stock fluctuations by 
using processing fluency. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
103(24), 9369-9372. 
Cronin, T. E. (1989). Direct democracy: The politics of initiative, referendum, and recall. 
New York, NY: Harvard.  
Edwards, K., & Smith, E. E. (1996). A disconfirmation bias in the evaluation of 
arguments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71(1), 5. 
Everson, D. (1981). The effects of initiatives on voter turnout: A comparative state 
analysis. Western Political Quarterly, 34, 415–425. 
Flesch, R. (1948). A new readability yardstick. Journal of Applied Psychology, 32(3), 
221. 
Gervais, W. M., & Norenzayan, A. (2012). Analytic thinking promotes religious 
disbelief. Science, 336(6080), 493-496. 
Hafer, C. L., Reynolds, K. L., & Obertynski, M. A. (1996). Message comprehensibility 
and persuasion: Effects of complex language in counterattitudinal appeals to 
laypeople. Social Cognition, 14(4), 317. 
Hauser, D. J., & Schwarz, N. (2016). Attentive Turkers: MTurk participants perform 
better on online attention checks than do subject pool participants. Behavior 
research methods, 48(1), 400-407. 
Hayes, A. F. (2013). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process  
LANGUAGE	COMPLEXITY,	BELIEF-CONSISTENCY,	AND	POLICY	EVALUATION	 	 	26
analysis: A regression-based approach. New York: Guilford Press. 
Magleby, D. B. (1984). Direct legislation: Voting on ballot propositions and the United 
States. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins. 
Oppenheimer, D. M. (2006). Consequences of erudite vernacular utilized irrespective of 
necessity: Problems with using long words needlessly. Applied Cognitive 
Psychology, 20(2), 139-156. 
Oppenheimer, D. M., Meyvis, T., & Davidenko, N. (2009). Instructional manipulation 
checks: Detecting satisficing to increase statistical power. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 45(4), 867-872. 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. In 
Communication and persuasion (pp. 1-24). Springer New York. 
Petty, R. E., Cacioppo, J. T., & Goldman, R. (1981). Personal involvement as a 
determinant of argument-based persuasion. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 41(5), 847. 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2004). SPSS and SAS procedure for estimating indirect 
effects in simple mediation models. Behavioral Research Methods, Instruments, 
& Computers, 36, 717-731.  
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for 
assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavioral 
Research Methods, 40, 879-891.  
Reber, R., Schwarz, N., & Winkielman, P. (2004). Processing fluency and aesthetic 
pleasure: Is beauty in the perceiver’s processing experience? Personality and 
Social Psychology Review, 8, 364–382.  
LANGUAGE	COMPLEXITY,	BELIEF-CONSISTENCY,	AND	POLICY	EVALUATION	 	 	27
Shah, A.K. and Oppenheimer, D.M. (2007) Easy does it: The role of fluency in cue 
weighting. Judgment and Decision Making, 2, 371–379.  
Shepherd, S., & Kay, A. C. (2012). On the perpetuation of ignorance: System 
dependence, system justification, and the motivated avoidance of sociopolitical 
information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(2), 264–280. 
Shockley, E., & Fairdosi, A. S. (2015). Power to the People? Psychological Mechanisms 
of Disengagement From Direct Democracy. Social Psychological and Personality 
Science, 6(5), 579–586. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LANGUAGE	COMPLEXITY,	BELIEF-CONSISTENCY,	AND	POLICY	EVALUATION	 	 	28
Appendix A 
G*Power analysis 
F tests - ANOVA: Fixed effects, special, main effects and 
interactions 
 
Analysis: A priori: Compute required sample size  
Input:  Effect size f                  = .1825 
   α err prob                     = 0.05 
   Power (1-β err prob)           = .8 
   Numerator df                   = 2 
   Number of groups               = 12 
Output:  Noncentrality parameter λ      = 9.7587312 
   Critical F                     = 3.0278979 
   Denominator df                 = 281 
   Total sample size              = 293 
   Actual power                   = 0.8008869 
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Appendix B 
Attention check  
Individual preferences and situational variables can greatly impact decision 
processes. In order to facilitate our research on decision-making we are interested in 
knowing certain factors about you, the decision maker. Specifically, we are interested in 
whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then some of our 
manipulations that rely on changes in the instructions will be ineffective. So, in order to 
demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please select the box labeled “Run for 
President of the USA” and ignore all of the other choices. Then move on to the next page. 
Thank you very much. 
 
Which of these activities do you engage in regularly? (select all that apply) 
• Protest 
• Sign petitions 
• Call representative 
• Riot 
• Boycotting 
• Run for President of the USA 
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Appendix C 
Policies (readability scores were not displayed in the experiment) 
Climate change policies 
Simple/For. This initiative is to tighten restrictions on businesses whose practices 
are contributing to climate change. They will have to report their usage of all forms of 
fuel and energy. (Flesch-Kincaid readability score = 55.0) 
Simple/Against. This initiative is to loosen restrictions on businesses that suffer 
due to the spread of climate change information. They will not have to report their usage 
of any form of fuel and energy. (Flesch-Kincaid readability score = 56.7) 
Complex/For. This initiative is to upsurge mandates on vendors that are 
degrading the environment. They will have to report their expenditure of materials that 
lead to radiative forcing such as Chlorofluorocarbons. (Flesch-Kincaid readability score = 
30.8) 
Complex/Against. This initiative is to slacken circumscriptions on vendors that 
have been writhing due to propagation of ecological data. They will not have to report 
their expenditure of materials that lead to radiative forcing such as Chlorofluorocarbons. 
(Flesch-Kincaid readability score = 26.4) 
Taxing corporations policies 
Simple/For. This initiative seeks to raise taxes for corporations whose earnings 
are above a set dollar amount. The money collected from such a tax will be used to pay 
for government programs for the nation's citizens. (Flesch-Kincaid readability score = 
56.1) 
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Simple/Against. This initiative seeks to lower taxes for corporations whose 
earnings are above a set dollar amount. The money saved from such a tax reduction will 
be used to expand businesses to create jobs. (Flesch-Kincaid readability score = 56.7) 
Complex/For. This initiative seeks to augment corporate tariffs on capital gains 
that occupy tariff cohorts exceeding fixed remuneration sums. The tariff monies collected 
will be utilized to subsidize government programs for national occupants. (Flesch-
Kincaid readability score = 16.1) 
Complex/Against. This initiative seeks to curtail corporate tariffs on capital gains 
that occupy tariff cohorts exceeding fixed remuneration sums. The tariff monies averted 
will be utilized to subsidize commerce expansion to engender occupations. (Flesch-
Kincaid readability score = 13.4) 
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Tables 
 Condition t-test complex vs. simple  
(Positive t-value = simple is easier to process) 
Issue Complex Simple t df p 
Climate Change: Against 3.23 5.32 4.16 60 <.001 
Climate Change: For 4.16 6.06 4.80 60 <.001 
Corporate Taxes: Against 3.90 6.00 4.78 60 <.001 
Corporate Taxes: For 4.42 6.13 4.16 60 <.001 
 
Table 1. Mean pretest ratings (N = 62) for processing ease (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree) where higher ratings indicate easier processing and independent samples 
t-tests demonstrating that simple versions of all policies, in all cases, are significantly 
easier to process. 
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 Belief-Consistency 
Condition 
Conditional 
Direct Effects 
Indirect Effects 
X à M    
 Consistent -2.16 [-2.73, -1.59]  
 Inconsistent -1.28 [-1.91, -.66]  
 No Preference -2.13 [-3.25, -1.01]  
M à Y    
 Consistent .52 [.39, .64]  
 Inconsistent -.05 [-.20, .10]  
 No Preference .37 [.16, .59]  
X à M à Y    
 Consistent  -1.12 [-1.62, -.70] 
 Inconsistent  .07 [-.12, .32] 
 No Preference  -.79 [-1.71, -.27] 
 
Table 2. Mediation models using complexity (X) to predict policy favorability (Y) 
indirectly through processing ease (M). The same model was run separately for each level 
of belief consistency (consistent, inconsistent, and no preference). Numbers denote 
unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals (bootstrapped CIs for indirect 
effects). Significant effects appear in bold.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Preregistered figure of our proposed results for the effects of language 
complexity on policy favorability as a function of policy preference consistency. 
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Figure 2. Observed results for the effects of language complexity on policy favorability 
as a function of policy preference consistency. 
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Figure 3. Mediation model testing if processing ease mediates the relationship between 
issue language complexity and policy favorability. We tested this model separately for 
each level of belief consistency (consistent, inconsistent, no preference). 
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